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A Proofs
For notational convenience, define  * ≡  * () =    R  * ( )() as the derivative of the continuation value of a firm with respect to its size  at the beginning of the next period. Given  ⊆ R  ( ≥ 1)  ⊆ R and any two functions   :  →   ¹  means  (x) ≤ (x) for all x ∈ . Similarly,  ≺  means  (x) ≤ (x) for all x ∈  and  (x)  (x) for some x ∈ . Whenever there is no ambiguity, the arguments of a function are suppressed.
Proof of Lemma 1.   is defined by (4), and the demand   of a consumer who did not purchase from firm (   ) in period  − 1 is
where Ω  () is the measure of consumers informed of  ≥ 0 firms in addition to firm (   ), and e    is the probability that the consumer chooses to buy from firm (   ) Let    1 denote the measure of consumers who purchased in period  − 1 from a firm that exited at the beginning of period  Let   =  + (1 − )   1 be the sum of the mass of new consumers and the mass of surviving consumers whose firms exited at the beginning of period . Label all of these consumers as 'unattached', since they have no information before they receive any ads. Label the rest of the consumers as 'attached', as they are informed of their most-recently-visited firms before they receive any ads. Then,
In (20), the term   Ψ  (0) gives the mass of unattached consumers who receive zero ads. The term for   0 is the mass of unattached consumers who receive  ads, plus the mass of attached consumers who receive ( − 1) ads. Next, let   ≡   (   ) be the probability that a consumer prefers firm (   ) to the firm he purchased from in period  − 1. Note that
where the first term in (21) is the probability that a consumer is unattached and has  new ads conditional on having information about  other firms, and the second term is the probability that a consumer is attached and has  − 1 new ads conditional on having information about  other firms. Using (19) and (21), one can then write
Because   ≤ 1 and    1 it follows that   (   ) ≤   (   ) Next, for   (   )  1
using (22) and differentiating with respect to price and rearranging yields
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (). Let  * (|  ) denote the equilibrium probability that an ad contains a price of at least  conditional on    The cumulative distribution function, 1 −  * (|  ) cannot have a mass at any  in its support otherwise any firm charging  could reduce its price slightly and steal a positive mass of consumers from other firms charging  leading to a discrete gain in firm value. Also, 1 −  * (|  ) cannot be flat over some interval ( 1   2 ), otherwise any firm charging  1 could increase its price to  2 without a reduction in its probability of sale. Thus, 1 −  * (|  ) is strictly increasing in  over the interior of its support [ * (  )  * (  )] where  * (  ) and  * (  ) are the minimum and maximum prices observed for firms with size    Therefore,
 be the demand function for a consumer conditional on    It follows that  * (|  )  = P ∞ =0 Ψ * () * −1  *   0, which also implies
Similar arguments apply to  * (   ).
Parts (), () and (). By the envelope theorem,
Because  *   0 by Part (i) and ( 
For (11) 
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that
There are then two possibilities:
But then firm value is non-increasing in firm size, and a firm has no incentive to increase its size, because exit probability increases as firm size increases. Because the only way a firm can grow is to send ads, there is then no advertising. Therefore, 
where  * is the probability of exit, ( 1   1 ) denotes the next period price and size, and
and 
where (     ) is the -period ahead price and size, and   is the size in period  Because  *    0 and exit probability declines with firm value, exit probability also declines with firm size, i.e.
 *    0 for all  In addition, it was assumed that 
Because the distribution of price and advertising pairs is continuous conditional on   , there
But because  6 =  0 and all other terms are identical in (29) and (30), the two equalities cannot hold simultaneously. Thus, there cannot be more than one discrete global interior maximizer.
The remaining possibility is that there exists a continuum of maximizers for firm (   ) that form a connected set  of ( ) pairs, and no other firm type has a value-maximizing price and advertising pair within this set. Suppose that is the case. Now consider any two valuemaximizing pairs ( 1   1 ) and ( 2   2 ) in this set such that  1   2 . Because it is assumed that there is no other firm type for which some pair ( ) ∈  is a value maximizer, firm (   ) can raise its price from  1 to  2 and still send  1 ads without a reduction in its residual demand, and thereby increase its value. This contradicts with ( 1   1 ) being part of the set

Taking the total derivative of (11) and (13) with respect to  leads to
where
is the determinant of the Hessian of  *  Note that ∆  0 given the fact that the Hessian of  * is negative definite at the global maximizer ( *   * ) Inside the square brackets in (31), the first term is negative because Φ 00  0 (Assumption 1),
To sign the second term inside the square brackets in (31), note that (5) and (11) together yield
because  *   0 and all other terms in the ratio on the r.h.s. of (32) are positive. Consequently, the expression in square brackets in (31) is negative, implying
To sign  *   , suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for two firm types with marginal cost  and sizes
can raise its price slightly without a reduction in its probability of sale and increase its profit per consumer, a contradiction with
does not depend on   directly, and it reduces to a function,  * () of price only. At this point, we allow for the possibility that in equilibrium  * ( * ) depends on firm size indirectly through the optimal price  *  By definitions (4) and (5), the demand functions
and  * (   ) are then also functions of price only:  * () and  * () Because a larger size now confers no additional surplus to any consumer, the demand functions for previousperiod customers and the new customers acquired through ads must also be identical, i.e.
Dividing through by   (1 − ) +   0 and rearranging terms, a firm's optimal price can be written as
The price depends on the elasticity   * ( * ) of the individual demand function  * ( * ) which is independent of firm size. Furthermore,  *  which is the change in the continuation value of the firm due to a change in its size  * at the beginning of the next period, is also independent of   . Consequently, price is not a function of   .
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 2(i) and the strict convexity of Φ (Assumption 1(i)) imply that a unique value-maximizing  * (   ) exists. Taking the total derivative of (11) and (13) with respect to  yields
To sign (33) 
where the sign follows because  *  *  − Φ 00  0 (because ∆  0) and Φ 00  0 (Assumption 1). As a result, the second term inside the brackets in (33) is negative. Consequently, the entire term inside the brackets in (33) is positive. Thus, (33) is negative.
To see the monotonicity of
has a higher expected return in the current period from a marginal ad
To see the last inequality, note that  * 2   * 1 (Proposition 2). Furthermore, it must be that
and have a probability of sale per ad
could then afford to raise its price and still have a higher probability of sale and higher profit per ad.
Thus, the marginal ad brings higher marginal profit in the current period to firm (  2  ) Because firm (  2  ) also has a lower likelihood of exit for all future periods, the consumer acquired through the marginal ad also brings a larger expected marginal benefit to firm (  2  ) from the next period onwards. The value effect of the marginal ad must therefore be larger for firm (  2  ) Then, by (13) and the fact that Φ 0 is strictly increasing, firm (  2  ) must send more ads.
Proof of Proposition 4. The properties of  * follow directly from its definition and the properties of  * and  * . Since both  * and  * are strictly increasing in    so is  *  To see the monotonicity of  * in  note that
Rearranging (11), and then substituting it in (34), we obtain
where the first inequality follows because  * −  +  *  0, and the second inequality from the fact that Proof of Theorem 1. Given any equilibrium measure of firms  * , the exit threshold
For positive entry in equilibrium, free entry condition (9) must hold with equality
} be the set of firm of types reachable from firm type (   ), conditional on staying in the industry. Define the operator   * as
0 otherwise, with norm k  * k  1 Invariance of  * in stationary equilibrium requires
A stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit is then given by a triplet ( * (·)  *   * ) that satisfies equations (35)- (37) simultaneously.
Next, consider the advertising equilibrium corresponding to a given measure  an entry mass , and an exit rule (·) Let  = {  (·)} Let  denote the space of continuous, bounded functions defined over firm types under
where   0 and   ∞ are the minimum and maximum firm sizes under  Endow  with the sup-norm. Define  :  →  as the operator that matches any  ∈  to some  () ∈  that results from the firms' optimal choices of advertising given the distribution of consumer surplus ( ) generated by the function  under  We will first show that, corresponding to any  there exists a unique advertising equilibrium such that the advertising policy  () adopted by firms under  generates a distribution of consumer surplus across ads that renders the same advertising policy () optimal for . We will then show the existence and uniqueness of a triplet  * = { *   *   * (·)} that satisfies ( Proof of Lemma 2. Given  and any  ∈ , consider the cumulative advertising (   ; ) made by firms that offer at most as much surplus as firm (   ) In other words,
where () is the marginal cost level such firm ( ()) offers as much surplus as firm (   )
does. Note that (   ; ) is continuous and monotonic in its arguments   and . Using (13), the integrand Γ is defined as
The dependence of the functions  , and  on ( ; ) is made explicit. Equation (38) is a Volterra-Fredholm type integral equation. We will show that (38) has a unique fixed point,
, in the space of continuous, bounded, and non-decreasing functions defined over (   ) pairs. For any  1 ( ; ) and  2 ( ; ) in that space, an application of Mean Value Theorem implies
where k·k denotes the sup-norm, and
Γ is bounded and continuous in its arguments, because Φ 0−1 and Λ are both continuous. here, but the fact that current cost shock affects end-of-period firm size implies that firm's future value depends on the current cost shock, allowing the exit threshold to be defined as  * (  ) as described in the text. A4 is also satisfied because in any period the probability, 1−() of observing a cost shock greater than  is positive for any . Finally, A5 is satisfied because the distribution of entrants' cost shocks,  is continuous.
Existence: Let  be the set of continuous, bounded, non-decreasing functions defined as (·) : R + → [ ∞). First, we show that, for any (·) ∈  and   0 an invariant
where  is the identity operator and ( − Next, we will say that the invariant measure ((·) ) is continuous on  if for all (·) ∈  and for every sequence
with respect to  is defined similarly, but simply on R + . Using arguments similar to Lemma 5 in Hopenhayn (1992) , it can be shown that the invariant measure ((·) ) is jointly continuous, strictly increasing in  and non-increasing in (·) i.e. for two exit schedules
for any non-decreasing function  and for any given   .
For any exit rule (·) define the entry mass   ((·)) implicitly as
In other words, for the invariant measure    ((·)) is the mass of entrants that are needed for the expected discounted profit for entrants,    to be equal to the cost of entry under the exit rule (·). Also, define   ((·)) as the mass of entrants such that for the invariant measure  the exit rule (·) is optimal, i.e. for all
A stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit exists if and only if there is a function
. This amounts to showing that the functions   and   intersect at least once.
It can be shown, analogous to Lemma 6 in Hopenhayn (1992) , that the function   :
 → R + is well-defined, continuous and strictly increasing, i.e. for any two functions
It can be shown that  is strictly increasing in    strictly decreasing in  non-decreasing in (·) and strictly decreasing in  Similarly, following Lemma 7 in Hopenhayn (1992), it can be shown that   is continuous and non-increasing on  as long as
) is continuous and strictly decreasing in  there
is non-increasing in (·) Now note that for any
because  is strictly increasing in    The fact that  (   ; ((·) )) has a maximum at
In the former case, there exists an equilibrium where   ( * (·)) =   ( * (·))  0 for some  * (·) ∈ , and in the latter there exists a stationary equilibrium with no entry and exit, i.e.
for some   ∞ and the exit rule
then, there exists a stationary equilibrium.
For positive entry and exit in equilibrium, entry must be relatively easy. If the entry cost satisfies    * =   ( * ) for some  *  0 then there exists some  * (·) ∈  such that
) Unless the advertising cost and fixed cost is very high, potential entrants have positive expected profit, i.e.   ( * )  0 so that  *  0 Therefore, an equilibrium with positive entry and exit exists.
Uniqueness: Suppose that there are two exit schedules  * 1 (·) and  * 2 (·) such that the corresponding measures  * 1 and  * 2 constitute stationary equilibria with positive entry and exit. Assume, without loss of generality, that  * 1 (0)   * 2 (0) that is, to survive the marginal entrant needs to be more efficient in economy 2 than in economy 1. Then, we must have
2 ) =  Therefore, firm value cannot be lower for all entrant types under  * 2 compared to  * 1 , and must increase for some. In other words, if the values of all entrant types move in the same direction in response to a change in the measure of firms, the free entry condition is violated under  * 2 and the two equilibria cannot coexist. We will show that this is the case. Assume, without loss of generality, that when the equilibrium measure of firms  * 1 changes to  * 2 , the profit of the most efficient entrant decreases, i.e.  * 2 (0 )   * 1 (0 ). If the profits of all entrants with marginal cost higher than  also decrease, then the equilibrium is unique. Take any
Consider the set of firm types that provide a consumer at least as much surplus as firm (0 ) under measure     = 1 2
because profit is strictly decreasing in the measure of firms that offer more consumer surplus than firm type (0 ).
This implies  * 2   * 1  i.e. entry mass must be higher for  * 2  But since  * is strictly increasing in  we must then also have Proof of Proposition 5. Part () Let  *  and  *  denote, respectively, the cumulative distribution function and the density of firm size for firms of age  ≥ 1 We will show that
be the largest cost shock that results in a firm size of at least  at the end of a period, starting from a previous period size of
is decreasing in its first argument and increasing in its second argument. To see this claim, note that  * (   ) is implicitly defined by the law of motion (7) as
Total differentiation with respect to   and  gives
where the inequalities follow from the signs of the individual terms established in earlier
propositions. The conditional probability that the current period size is at most  can then be written as
because new firms start with no customers. For age  = 2
where  * 1  0 and  * 1 are the minimum and maximum firm sizes at age  = 1. But note that
with (39) and (40), implies  *
Part () Follows from part () and Proposition 1.
B Simulation algorithm
We outline the simulation algorithm used for comparative statics. The baseline advertising technology, Φ() =    generates positive advertising for any   1. To see this claim, note that Assumption 1(iii) is satisfied because
for   1 Therefore, the marginal cost of advertising at  = 0, represented by the second term in the l.h.s. of (13), is zero. What remains to be shown is that the marginal return to advertising represented by the first term in the l.h.s. of (13) is positive, and thus exceeds the marginal cost at  = 0. A feasible, but not necessarily optimal, action available to any firm is to charge monopoly price and sell, at least, to its captive consumers. This action yields positive revenue per ad for a firm, because, as long as advertising is not free, there is always a positive mass of consumers whose only ad is the ad they received from the firm. Formally, the revenue per ad for a type (   ) firm when it charges its monopoly price
where the first inequality follows from the fact that 
is also set to be the . of a two-dimensional discrete uniform
1 There are two alternative methods of iteration on these functions. One method is to construct separate loops of iteration for each function. The second method is simultaneous iteration of all or a subset of the functions under one single loop. The first method is more robust, but computationally slower. The second method is faster with potential problems of robustness. To deal with the robustness issues, small step sizes for updating functions may be used. We tried both methods, and given the dimensionality of the setup, we found that using the second method with small step sizes is easier.
where   (   ) is the probability that among all the sales that take place, the firm type that makes a randomly selected sale is not preferred to firm type (   ) Since we do not have 
2a. Compute
over a grid for   and    . Solve the discrete-space version of the corresponding first order conditions (11) and (13), and find the optimal price and advertising levels   and   for each firm type using
, and
2b. Compute period sales and profits for all firm types
Compute total number of ads
Obtain the updated value function
Compute the exit indicator
2c. Obtain the updated surplus functions for consumers,
Obtain the implied distribution of ads across firm types  0 (      ) using the optimal number of ads   sent by each firm type and the measure of firms (     ) i.e.
Also, obtain the implied distribution of sales across firm types  0
and go back to Step 2.
4. Obtain the entry mass  using the discrete version of the free entry condition,
and compute the exit rule (  ) point-wise as
entails positive entry and exit. Otherwise, set (
) and go back to
Step 2.
C Calculation of Total Factor Productivity
Plant (establishment) level TFP is aggregated to the firm level by weighting each plant's TFP measure in a given industry by its share of total value of firm's shipments in that industry. Recognizing that many plants manufacture several products that fall within more than just one 4-digit SIC industry, we use the multifactor superlative index number for the revenue-based productivity measurement. This index measures a plant's productivity relative to other plants in its main 4-digit SIC industry -the industry in which the plant has the largest value of shipments. For details on this index, see the discussion of Malmquist productivity indices in Section 4 of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) . A similar approach is followed by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) . An establishment's output is measured using deflated (real) value of shipments plus nominal inventory investments. The inputs are measured using deflated value of equipment, deflated value of plant, total labor hours, deflated value of materials, and deflated value of energy. Labor inputs are measured as an establishment's production-worker hours adjusted by multiplying the production-worker hours by the ratio of total payroll to payroll of production workers. Equipment and plant inputs are establishment's book values for their structure and equipment stocks deflated using sector-specific deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Materials and energy inputs are based on establishment's expenditures on materials and energy deflated using the input price indices in NBER Productivity Database. For the calculation of 4-digit industry-level cost shares, materials and energy expenditures and payments to labor are aggregated across establishments in the industry. Industry level cost of capital is obtained by first multiplying an establishment's real capital stock with the capital rental rates for the 2-digit industry an establishment belongs to, and then aggregating across establishments in the 4-digit industry. Each input cost is divided by the total cost at the industry level to obtain the cost share of the input. The quantity-based (physical) TFP is calculated in the same way as in Appendix A2 of Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) . Because the firms in the sample for price regressions are highly specialized in their primary products and these products are highly homogenous, we do not use a multi-product productivity measurement for the case of physical TFP.
D Industry Definitions
A constraint on the selection of the industries in Table 3 Notes: All variables are in levels. OLS estimation is based on Heckman's two-step correction. IMR is the ratio of the standard normal density to the standard normal c.d.f. predicted from the selection equation. Coefficients in OLS estimation (except for that of IMR) are marginal effects that take selection into account. Corrected standard errors in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Industry fixed effects are based on 1997 SIC codes (4-digit). 
